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Abstract
We empirically examine the hypothesis that access to deposits with inelastic rates (core deposits)
permits a bank to make contractual agreements with borrowers that are infeasible if the bank must pay market
rates for its funds.  Access to core deposits insulates a bank’s costs of funds from exogenous shocks,
allowing the bank to insulate its borrowers against exogenous credit shocks.  Using a large sample of loans
from the Survey of Terms of Bank Lending, we find that, controlling for competitive conditions in loan
markets, banks funded more heavily with core deposits provide more smoothing of loan rates in response to
exogenous changes in aggregate credit risk.  This suggests that a distinctive feature of bank lending is that
firms and banks form multiperiod lending relationships, in which loans need not break even period by period. 
It also partially explains the declining share of bank loans (or near substitutes for bank loans) in credit
markets.  As banks have increasingly been forced to pay market rates for an increasing share of their funds,
multiperiod relationship lending has become increasingly less feasible and bank loans have lost some of their
comparative advantage over securities.  Our results suggest that access to core deposits is one of the
foundations of relationship lending.
Keywords: intermediation, banks, relationship lending, disintermediation, securitization
JEL Classifications: G2, G3, G1See Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) and Thakor (1996) for excellent critical reviews of the theory
1
of intermediation.  Nakamura (1993b), Berlin (1996), and Berger and Udell (1998) provide reviews of the
recent empirical literature on bank lending.
One (indirect) approach to this question is to examine the differences between bank loans and other
2
types of private debt, which might then be related to differences in the intermediaries’ liabilities. The
literature on the announcement effects of bank loan and other private debt agreements (see Billet, Flannery
and Garfinkel, 1995) has yet to settle the question of whether bank loan agreements and other private debt
agreements have different announcement effects.  In a related vein, Carey, Post, and Sharpe (1998) have
compared both loan terms and borrower characteristics in a sample that includes both bank loan agreements
and finance company loan agreements.  Although they find differences, notably that finance company
borrowers are riskier, none of the differences have yet been linked in any obvious way to the differences in the
structure of bank and finance company liabilities.
Deposits and Relationship Lending
1.  Introduction
Empirical explorations of the theory of the banking firm have documented a number of characteristic
and distinctive features of bank lending.   A durable lending relationship, in which the bank gains information
1
about the borrowing firm, has been shown to be valuable both to small firms (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, and
Berger and Udell, 1995) and also to large firms (Lummer and McConnell, 1989, and Slovin, Sushka, and
Polonchek, 1993).  In particular, continuing relationships are associated with lower loan rates, less stringent
collateral requirements, and a lower likelihood of credit rationing.  There is substantial evidence that banks
are specialists in providing contractual flexibility and reducing the costs of financial distress for borrowing
firms. (e.g., Gilson, John, Lang ,1990; Preece and Mullineaux, 1996; James, 1995, 1996; and Cantillo and
Wright, 1997).  Bank loan rates also appear to move in a smoother fashion than do market interest rates,
which Berger and Udell (1992) have interpreted as evidence of implicit risk-sharing agreements.
However, the empirical literature is nearly silent on one of the central questions in the theory of
intermediation: How are these typical lending behaviors related to the structure of the bank’s liabilities, if at
all?   Our paper provides empirical evidence for an explicit link between banks’ liability structure and their
2
distinctive lending behavior.  We provide evidence on a particular link that relates bank market power in2
Nakamura (1993a) presents empirical evidence for another view, the “checking account hypothesis,”
3
a view associated with Black (1975) and Fama (1985).  According to this hypothesis, checking accounts
provide information about borrowing firms’ transactions, which in turn provide information about the firms’
financial health.
deposit markets to the types of loan contracts (explicit or implicit) that banks and their borrowers can feasibly
forge.   In our view, core deposits—funds that are largely rate inelastic—have historically insulated bank
3
funding costs against economic shocks.  In turn, core deposits have permitted banks to insulate borrowers
against these shocks through implicit multiperiod contracts that insure borrowers against adverse credit
shocks.  There are multiple ways that a bank might insulate borrowing firms against adversity, but we
examine one particular mechanism—loan-rate smoothing.  Specifically, we propose that banks with more
core deposits smooth firms’ borrowing costs in the face of adverse aggregate credit shocks.  Although risk-
averse firms would clearly value this type of insurance, so would risk-neutral firms seeking to avoid costly
asset liquidation or foregone investment opportunities that might accompany sudden spikes in borrowing
costs.
 We test this hypothesis using a rich data set, the Survey of Terms of Bank Lending to Business,
which provides quarterly information about contract terms of loans made by a large sample of banks, and
quarterly Call Report data about these banks’ balance sheets.  Our empirical results provide support for the
hypotheses that: (i) banks offer borrowers insurance against credit shocks; and (ii) banks with greater access
to core deposits provide more insurance to borrowers.
We proceed as follows.  In Section 2 we present a model to illustrate our hypotheses and discuss the
related literature.  In Section 3 we describe the data and present our main empirical results.  In this section we
also discuss and reject alternative interpretations of our main findings—especially the possibility that the
results are driven by unobserved changes in the credit risk of the borrowing populations at low and high core3
Other models of relationship lending include Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), Petersen and Rajan
4
(1995) and Boot and Thakor (1996).  None of these emphasizes the relationship between competition in the
market for bank liabilities and the lending behavior of banks.
deposit banks.  Finally, we conclude in Section 4.  In our concluding section we relate our results to the recent
trend toward disintermediation, in which commercial banks have lost market share to other types of
intermediaries that hold securities rather than loans.
2.  Models and Hypotheses
2.1  An illustrative model
The idea that banks optimally make loans that do not break even period by period is a well-
established one in the literature on bank uniqueness.  We present a simple illustrative model to clarify our
argument regarding the relationship between bank contracting practices and their access to core deposits.  
4
Although our claim is that a distinctive feature of bank lending is that banks’ access to core deposits
facilitates multiperiod agreements with borrowers, our view can be conveyed in a stylized way by examining a
model with a single loan transaction.
2.1.1  The basic setup
We focus on the contracting behavior of a single firm and a bank—both of which are risk neutral. 
There are two time periods.  At the beginning of period 0 the firm and the bank share a common prior belief
about the state of the economy in period 1, denoted by the random variable s 0 {d,u}; that is, the economy
will experience a downturn (d) in period 1 with probability p or an upturn (u) with probability (1!p).  Both
the firm and the bank learn the realization of s at the outset of period 1.  The state of the economy is both
observable and verifiable.
At the beginning of period 1, the firm needs to invest $1 to continue production.  At the end of periodd (k % A(k))
dk
’ 1 % Ak(k) < 0 ,
4
The assumption that R  = 0 simplifies things without loss of essential insights.
5
d
For simplicity we assume that the state of the economy can affect the value of the firm’s assets only
6
through the liquidation decision, although the liquidation decision may be state dependent.
1 the firm can feasibly produce revenue R , s,{u,d}, with R  > R = 0, without liquidating any assets, but can s u d 
also generate additional revenue by liquidating assets.   Denote the value of the firm’s assets—which include
5
future investment opportunities—by A(k), where k0[0,K] denotes the additional cash generated by
liquidating assets.   Thus, A (k) < 0.  When we say that the firm liquidates assets, we have in mind any
6
k
activity that reduces the value of future production activities to generate revenue today, and there is no
presumption that the firm is in default when it liquidates assets.  Since we are concerned about potentially
inefficient liquidation, we assume that liquidating assets to produce revenue reduces the total value of the
firm, ex post, i.e.,
(1)
We consider a highly stylized and simplified liability structure.  The bank is fully funded by deposits,
which the bank acquires after the realization of the state of the economy at the outset of period 1 and which
are paid off at the end of period 1.  The bank has access to q (< 1) dollars of low cost core deposits, with
exogenous interest rate factor D, which is independent of the state of the economy.  The bank can also acquire
purchased funds—for which it must pay the market interest rate factor, D , with  s
D  > D    and   pD  + (1!p)D  > D.  (2) d u d u
Thus, the cost of purchased funds is state dependent, and their expected cost is higher than that for core
deposits.
Our stylized liability structure is intended to capture the following ideas.  The cost of equity capital is
higher than that of deposits, so the bank holds the regulatory minimal level of capital.  Setting the capitalRu > Du , Dd > 0 , and K > qD % (1&q)Dd,
Af ’ p Rd % kd % A(kd) & rd % (1&p) Ru % ku % A(ku) & ru ,
Ab ’ prd % (1&p)ru & pCd(q) % (1&p)Cu(q) ,
5
Note that the bank can write fully state-contingent contracts (including equity claims) with its
7
borrowers.  The reason inefficient liquidation cannot be avoided is that the bank cannot obtain fully state-
contingent liabilities.  The assumption that state-contingent loan contracts are perfectly enforceable is for
narrative purposes only.  We actually have in mind implicit contracts that may not be perfectly enforceable. 
ratio at zero is of no special significance.  What is important is that the bank cannot profitably write state-
contingent contracts with enough investors at the beginning of period 0 to fully insulate the borrower against
the need to liquidate assets.   The higher cost of purchased funds in an economic downturn compared with
7
their cost in an economic upturn reflects an economywide risk premium that the bank must pay in competitive
funding markets.  Such a premium is typical at the beginning of a downturn.
The following parametric restrictions hold:
(3)
The first two inequalities say that a bank financed solely with purchased funds need not require the firm to
liquidate assets in an upturn, but in a downturn such a bank must force the firm to liquidate assets so that
depositors can be paid off—remembering that R  = 0.  The third inequality ensures that a bank financed with d
at least q dollars of core deposits will be able to pay off depositors, whatever the state of the economy.
2.1.2 Equilibrium Loan Contracts
At the beginning of period 0, the firm and the bank have a binding state-contingent contract with two
loan rate factors, {r , r }, which implicitly define two liquidation levels, {k  , k }.  The firm’s expected profit u  d u d
under this contract is:
(4)
and the bank’s expected profit is:
(5)
where C (q) / qD + (1-q)D  denotes the bank’s cost of funds in state s, s0{u,d}. s sk
(




d ’ Cd(q) .
Max Af(rd,ru) ,
rd,ru
prd%(1&p)ru $ pDd % (1&p)Du / De.
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The optimal contract will maximize the joint profits of the bank and the firm.  Since liquidating
assets always reduces firm value (by condition (1)), any optimal contract will reduce liquidation costs to a
minimum.  Given the parametric restrictions in (3), no assets need to be liquidated in an upturn, but assets
will typically need to be liquidated in a downturn (unless q is very high). 
Then, the optimal contract will always satisfy,
(6)
Condition (6) says that assets will be liquidated only in a downturn and that the firm will be required to
liquidate just enough assets to pay off depositors. 
We assume that the bank is a Bertrand competitor in the loan market, taking the structure of its
liabilities as given. In this setting, the optimal contract solves:
(7)
subject to (6) and,
(8)
Inequality (8) is a participation constraint, which says that the bank must expect to make as much revenue
from lending as it could from investing in securities that pay market interest rates (with expected return D ). 
e
This constraint ensures that the bank captures rents from its core depositors, although Bertrand competition
guarantees that it captures no further rents from borrowers.  Thus, these Bertrand-competitive banks do earn
positive profit, a return on the fixed factor of production (core deposits), to which they have exclusive access. 
We discuss constraint (8) further below.






















The loan rate in a downturn is just high enough to cover the bank’s cost of funds.  In an upturn, the
loan rate is set so that (8) is satisfied with equality.  We can now derive our main prediction, that the loan rate
profile—the difference in the rates paid in downturns and upturns—is flatter for banks that have more core
deposits.  From (9),
(10)
where the inequality follows, since core deposits are cheaper than purchased funds.  Intuitively, a bank with
more core deposits receives lower net revenue in the downturn because its lower cost of funds deposits
permits the bank to offer the firm a lower loan rate to reduce the inefficient liquidation of assets.  Thus, it
charges a higher rate in the upturn to satisfy participation constraint (8).
In our Bertrand market, where the bank has an outside investment option—investing in securities, the
expected loan rate charged to a borrower is not affected by the bank’s access to core deposits.  This follows,
since the loan contract yields expected revenue just high enough to cover the bank’s expected market return,
which is independent of q.  That is, from the bank’s participation constraint, 
(11)
and D  is independent of q.
e
2.1.3 Discussion
In our model, the bank’s access to core deposits allows it to insulate the firm against credit shocks as
part of an optimal contract.  To keep things as simple as possible, we have cast the contracting problem in a
static setting, but the essential feature of our optimal contract would carry over in a straightforward way to an
intertemporal model with aggregate credit shocks.  The key is that the bank is free to charge concessionary
rates in bad times and compensatory rates in good times.  If a bank can offer below-market rates on deposits,8
Empirically, this second assumption amounts to the belief that banks could profitably offer
8
depositors transactions services while investing in a portfolio of Treasury securities.  (Of course, our simple
model takes no account of the costs of offering transactions services.)  It is unlikely that a bank portfolio
composed purely of Treasury securities could be profitable, since even money market funds, which offer less
extensive and costly transactions services than banks, hold approximately 40 percent of their portfolios in
commercial paper rather than all in Treasuries.
it has more freedom to offer loan rates that do not break even period by period—a type of cross-subsidization
between depositors and borrowers facilitated by the bank.  The more relaxed budget constraint facilitates
relationship building and flexibility in the pricing of loans.  A bank forced to pay market rates for its funds
simply has less freedom to demand of the borrower anything but the single-period profit-maximizing loan
rate.
We view two features of our illustrative model as potentially objectionable.  The first is our
assumption that the loan market is perfectly competitive, an assumption that is clearly unrealistic for many
small and medium-sized borrowers.  The second is that the bank has an outside investment
option—investment in market securities—that allows it to capture rents on its captive depositors and
prevents competition in loan markets from forcing banks to pass through some of these rents to borrowers in
the form of lower average loan rates.  
8
Allowing imperfectly competitive loan markets or permitting banks’ cost of funds C(q) to affect the
distribution of rents between the bank and the borrower would not affect our main result: that the equilibrium
contract will involve loan-rate smoothing and that the degree of smoothing will be positively related to the
bank’s available core deposits.  The joint profit maximizing contract—which requires a flatter loan rate
profile—will be the equilibrium contract across a wide range of market structures and distributions of the
contractual surplus.  Thus, we make the following prediction, which we formalize and test in Section 3:
Hypothesis: An exogenous increase in aggregate credit risk will lead to a smaller increase in loan9
For example, in a symmetric Bertrand duopoly, higher core deposit levels imply lower average loan
9
rates.
Although Allen and Gale show that a system of intertemporal transfers may yield a Pareto
10
improvement over the market outcome, we make no such claim about the bank in our model.
markups for firms borrowing from banks with higher levels of core deposits than from banks with lower
levels of core deposits.
The exact relationship between a bank’s core deposits and the average loan rate, however, depends
upon the fine details of the model of competition, and we do not expect the loan rate to be independent of core
deposit levels as in our simple model.  In general, higher core deposits can have two opposing effects on
average loan rates.  Core deposits permit the bank to reduce inefficient liquidation of assets, which increases
total contractual surplus.  Holding constant the bargaining power between the bank and the borrower, this
will tend to raise average loan rates.  But the distribution of the contractual surplus may be affected by the
bank’s core deposit level.  In models where the bank’s cost of funds affects its threat point in bargaining over
the average loan rate, more core deposits can lower the bank’s bargaining power, which will tend to reduce




The introduction has already highlighted some of the connections between our model and preceding
empirical work in the theory of intermediation.  Our work has particularly close links to three recent papers. 
Allen and Gale (1997) present a general equilibrium model in which a bank-centered financial system permits
intertemporal risk sharing that would be impossible in a decentralized market.  As in our model—where
captive depositors facilitate intertemporal wealth transfers—Allen and Gale’s optimal allocation can be
supported only in a world where agents have limited market power.
1010
Given the relatively short-term and repetitive nature of our intertemporal trades, we do not feel that
11
enforceability concerns are as burdensome as in the long-term relationships in Petersen and Rajan.
Petersen and Rajan have detailed information about the borrowing firms over time, but only
12
fragmentary information about their lenders.  We have information about a changing pool of loans over
time—an imperfect proxy for the borrowing firms—but very detailed information about their lenders.
An important contribution is Petersen and Rajan (1995), who present and test a model with a flavor
similar to our own.  In their paper, banks make low interest rate loans to high-risk customers as part of a
long-term implicit contract, a type of intertemporal insurance contract against shocks to a firm’s credit risk. 
These intertemporal insurance contracts are feasible only if the bank has ex post monopoly power in loan
markets.
They test their model of relationship lending using data on small business firms.  Using the age of the
firm as a proxy for firm creditworthiness and the Herfindahl index for the local deposit market as a proxy for
the degree of competition in loan markets, Petersen and Rajan show that in markets with a higher Herfindahl
index, loan rates fall more slowly over a firm’s life.  In other words, when a bank has monopoly power, it can
offer a firm a lower-than-competitive rate early in the firm’s life and then make up for this by charging a
higher-than-competitive rate later in the firm’s life.
There are a number of differences between our work and Petersen and Rajan’s.  Most important, we
focus on market power in the deposit market, rather than the loan market, as the source of loan rate
smoothing.  Also, we examine shorter-term intertemporal contracts than do Petersen and Rajan.  In our
empirical results, loan rate smoothing occurs (roughly) over a business cycle, a period significantly shorter
than the lifetime of a firm.   Despite the differences, we view our approaches—and viewpoints—as
11
complementary.   The main point of both papers—that the set of feasible loan contracts depends in an
12
essential way upon the degree of competition—is similar.11
Nonetheless, we find that banks with higher core deposit ratios also provide more insurance against
13
interest rate shocks, as we discuss later.
As noted above, Berger and Udell (1992) have shown that bank loan rates are less volatile than
market interest rates, but they make no attempt to relate smoothing to banks’ liability structure.  Also, our




3.1  The data
Our two main sources of data are the quarterly Survey of Terms of Bank Lending to Business
(STBL) and the Reports of Conditions (Call Reports).  Since 1977, the STBL has collected detailed
microeconomic data on bank loan characteristics from a stratified sample of approximately 340 banks.  In the
first week of the second month of each quarter, each bank in the sample provides individual data on every
business loan it made on a particular day (or number of days).  This data set provides a remarkably rich
source of information on bank contracting practices, as they vary across banks and over time.  All balance-
sheet data for the banks in our sample come from the Call Reports, which banks file quarterly.
From the complete data set we constructed a panel that includes 126 banks that reported in each
quarter from the first quarter of 1977 through the fourth quarter of 1989.  Our panel excludes all surveyed
banks that disappeared through failure or merger during the period.  We exclude these banks because we do
not want any smoothing results to be driven by banks that engaged in excessively risky investment strategies
that ultimately led to failure.  The period following 1989 witnessed major changes in the sample of reporting
banks through failures and mergers, so, to retain a relatively large and representative panel, we ended ourMARKUPibt ’ a0 % a1CORE DEPOSIT RATIObt % a2CREDIT RISKbt
% a3CREDIT RISKbt × CORE DEPOSIT RATIObt % a4 CONTROL VARIABLESibt .
12
For example, in 1996Q3, 73 banks in the panel remained.  During the 1980s, small banks were
14
more likely than large banks to have dropped from the sample either because of failure or merger or from lack
of reporting in a quarter.  Thus, our panel is skewed toward the larger banks in the survey.  But this effect
should bias our results against finding a relationship between core deposits and loan rate smoothing, since we
expect that implicit contracting practices are more likely to be important for small banks and small
borrowers. 
We have also performed all of our regressions using an alternative, narrower measure of core
15
deposits, which includes deposits with denominations under $100,000 less small time deposits.  The results
are substantially the same, and we report here only the results for the broader measure. 
sample period in 1989.
14
3.2  Empirical tests
Our regressions take the following general form:
(12)
The subscripts refer to loan i from bank b made in time period t.  In all regressions the dependent
variable is the markup over the risk-free rate paid by the borrowing firm.  More specifically, this is the
difference between the loan rate and the rate on a Treasury security with duration equal to that of the loan. 
(Table 1 summarizes our variable definitions.)
In our regressions we test the hypothesis that banks more heavily financed with core deposits provide
borrowers with better insurance against adverse shocks to their creditworthiness.  Our measure of the core
deposit ratio is deposits with denominations less than $100,000 as a fraction of total liabilities.   We use
15
two alternative measures of core deposits, both of which reduce concerns about the endogeneity of the bank’s
core deposit level.  Our preferred measure is the three-year average of the bank’s core deposit ratio, where the
average is taken over the calendar year prior, the current year, and the calendar year after the loan is made. 
For example, for any loan made in any quarter of 1977, we use the bank’s average core deposit ratio over
1976Q1-1978Q4.  While the averaging can help alleviate endogeneity problems, the main logic of this13
We also reran the regressions using two alternative measures of core deposits (and other balance-
16
sheet controls), the contemporaneous core deposit ratio and the average core deposit ratio over the entire
sample period 1977Q1-1989Q4.  There was no qualitative change in our results.
measure is that a bank’s long-term liability structure, rather than transient changes in its liability structure,
should be more important for strategic decisions such as loan pricing policy.  Nonetheless, as an alternative,
we also use the bank’s one-year lagged core deposit ratio, i.e., we regress the loan markup at time t on the
bank’s core deposit ratio one year prior to t.   While this helps with any potential endogeneity problem, we
16
think it is less reflective of the underlying liability structure  of the bank, and thus we prefer the averages.
According to our hypothesis, the coefficient on the interaction term between credit risk and core
deposits, a  in equation (12), should be negative, because banks with more core deposits are better able to 3
protect their borrowers against shocks to their borrowing costs.
Because there is no one accepted measure of exogenous credit risk, we consider four alternative
measures, each of which has certain benefits and drawbacks.  Our preferred measure is the quality spread,
which is the difference between yields on Baa-rated and Aaa-rated long-term bonds; it averages 1.36 percent
over our sample period.  This measure has the advantage of being forward looking, but may be a better
measure of credit risk for borrowers who have access to national bond markets than for the majority of firms
that borrow in local markets.  Similarly, the quarterly growth in GDP and the quarterly growth in employment
are also aggregate measures that are inversely related to credit risk; over our sample period, GDP growth
averages 2.8 percentage points and employment growth averages 2.4 percentage points.  These are clearly
aggregate measures of economic activity, but are contemporaneous rather than forward-looking indicators. 
To make it easier for the reader to interpret and compare our results, we report them in terms of !1×GDP
growth and !1×employment growth, since both GDP growth and employment growth are positively related14
Because the state unemployment rate already accounts for variation across banks, we report results
17
that do not include bank-specific dummy variables when state unemployment is used as our measure of credit
risk.  We did, however, rerun these regressions with bank-specific dummy variables, and the only
specification that had a qualitative change in results was the one with both bank-specific dummy variables
and year-specific dummies; in this one case, the coefficient on the cross-term between the core deposit ratio
and the state unemployment rate was positive.
The state unemployment rate was available beginning in 1979Q1 for all states except North
18
Carolina, where it was available beginning in 1985Q1.  Thus, the regressions using the state unemployment
rate were estimated over the 1979Q1-1989Q4 period (and in the 1979Q1-1984Q4 subperiod, these
regressions exclude loans made by the two banks in our sample that were headquartered in North Carolina).
to credit risk.  Note that these three aggregate measures of credit risk vary over time but not across banks;
thus, to better exploit some of the cross-sectional variation in our sample, we include bank-specific dummy
variables whenever one of these three variables is used to measure credit risk.
In contrast to these aggregate measures, our final credit-risk measure—the unemployment rate in the
state in which the bank is headquartered (state unemployment)—exploits the cross-sectional nature of our
data.  The average unemployment rate over our sample period and states is 6.9 percent, but the rates are quite
variable across banks and time—the minimum range in state unemployment rates across the states
represented in any quarter in our sample is 5.3 percentage points, while the maximum range is 11.3
percentage points, and the mean range is 8.0 percentage points.   One drawback, however, is that the state
17
unemployment rate is not likely to be a good measure of credit risk for firms that operate in national and
international markets.   Further, we have some concern that it is a lagging measure of economic conditions.
18
The control variables can be divided into three groups:
The first group includes bank-specific variables.  The most important function of these variables is
to proxy for factors related to the bank-specific component of default risk.  In particular, we hope to proxy for
changes in the bank’s credit screening policy and the riskiness of the bank’s portfolio, which are ultimately
unobservable.  First, we include a direct proxy for bank-specific default risk, the bank’s net chargeoffs in the15
Hannan (1991) finds evidence that the deposit market Herfindahl index is positively related to loan
19
rates on small loans.  Note that Petersen and Rajan (1995) interpret the deposit-market Herfindahl as a
measure of loan-market concentration.
second year after the loan is granted as a fraction of total loans (chargeoffs-2) and net chargeoffs in the third
year after the loan is granted as a fraction of total loans (chargeoffs-3).  Note that we use future chargeoffs,
as we assume that looser screening should manifest itself with higher chargeoffs in the future, not
contemporaneously.  We also include the loan-to-deposit ratio (loans/deposits) and equity-to-asset ratio
(equity/assets), either using the one-year lagged value or three-year average value (consistent with the core
deposit ratio).  Higher loan-to-deposit ratios and lower equity-to-asset ratios may be associated with riskier
portfolio strategies.  Our measure of bank size is ln(total assets) in ln(millions of 1982 dollars), which
proxies for scale-related components of lending costs; we also use either the one-year lagged value or three-
year average value.  Finally, we include the Herfindahl index for the bank’s deposit market.  Although our
preferred measure of market power is core deposits, there is evidence that market concentration generates
monopoly power for some types of deposits (see Berger and Hannan, 1989).  Also, for smaller borrowers in
our sample, loan-market concentration may be related to deposit-market concentration.  If this is true, the
Herfindahl index may also control for the bank’s monopoly power in loan markets.
19
The second group of control variables includes contract variables.  We recognize that these contract
terms are offered as a package along with the loan rate and that, to some extent, the loan rate and other
contract terms are jointly determined.  However, we believe that the degree of substitutability among contract
terms may be small in practice.  Accordingly, we view the other contract terms as controls for borrower-
specific default risk, as well as controls for other borrower-specific lending costs.  The contract variables
include the ln(face value) in ln(millions of 1982 dollars) and the duration of the loan, as well as a set of16
Whether the loan was part of a participation was not reported on the STBL until 1982Q3;
20
therefore, it could not be included as a control variable.  In preliminary regressions using a hold-out sample of
200 loans chosen randomly each quarter, we performed estimations over a shorter period (1982Q3-1989Q4)
and included this variable.  Unlike most of the other contract terms, it was significant in only two of our four
regressions (using GDP growth and employment growth).  As we discuss below, the contract-term variables
can be omitted without qualitative changes to our results.  (We excluded the loans in our hold-out sample
when performing the regressions reported here to alleviate pretesting concerns.)
We use the business day prime rate as reported in the Federal Reserve Board’s H.15 statistical
21
release and not the bank-specific prime rates reported on the STBL database.  The business day prime rate is
the one quoted by a majority of the major banks surveyed by the Federal Reserve.
For the subperiod 1982Q3-1989Q4, when banks reported on the STBL whether the loan was part
22
of a participation, below-prime loans were more likely to be participated.  The averages for the below-prime
loans disguise a surprising degree of variability among the below-prime borrowers that we found in the
sample.  Most notably, there are several small, below-prime, collateralized loans made by banks with high
core deposit ratios.
dummy variables that indicate whether the loan is collateralized, whether it was made under a preexisting
commitment, or whether it has a fixed base rate.
20
One last contractual variable is of special importance: whether the loan was made at a rate above or
below the prime rate on the day the loan was made.   We view the above-prime and below-prime loan
21
markets as essentially different markets (see Brady, 1985).  Below-prime borrowers often have access to
national markets, and many have access to money markets.  Above-prime borrowers are more bank dependent
and are unlikely to have access to money markets. Table 2 shows difference-in-means and difference-in-
medians tests for some characteristics of loans made to the two samples; it is immediately clear that above-
and below-prime loans are very different, being made to different types of customers, and for the most part,
by different types of banks.  Below-prime loans are larger, less likely to be collateralized, of shorter duration,
and more likely to be made at a fixed rate.  They are also more likely to be made by larger banks with
somewhat lower core deposit ratios.  
22
Close banking relationships are much less likely to be important—or feasible—for our below-prime17
We did estimate our regressions using the below-prime sample of loans and found little support for
23
credit-risk smoothing; the coefficient on the cross term between the core deposit ratio and credit risk was
significantly positive for the quality spread and !1×employment growth regressions, insignificantly negative
for the !1×GDP growth regression, and significantly positive in the state unemployment rate regression,
when either one-year lagged or three-year average control variables were used.
Below we discuss alternative specifications to control for time.
24
borrowers, and our theory concerns relationship lending and smoothing of credit-risk shocks. (This is not to
say that there are no relationship aspects to lending behavior between large borrowers and their banks, only
that routine insulation against credit shocks is not likely to be an important feature of such relationships.) 
Hence, we look for evidence in the subsample of above-prime loans.   Below we discuss some robustness
23
tests that address concerns about whether a potential bias is introduced by selecting a sample based on loan
prices, given that the dependent variable in the regression is the loan rate markup.
Finally, we include a simple linear time trend (trend).  This is a crude attempt to control for secular
changes in banking markets over the period that may not be captured by our risk measures and market rate
measures.   We also include the money market rate, the rate on the Treasury security with the same duration
24
as that of the loan, since markups may vary with interest rate levels.  Since both the markup and the money
market rate are defined for securities of equal duration, this specification also permits the shape of the yield
curve to affect the loan markup.  The variable may also serve as an indicator of the stance of monetary policy
(especially as the average duration in our sample is under six months and the median duration is under three
months).
3.3  Empirical findings
Since our sample size is so large in our main regressions—over 600,000 loans—discussions of
statistical significance at conventional levels would convey little information.  Most of our variables are
significant at levels well below 0.01 percent.  Accordingly, we focus on the signs of the coefficients and on18
their economic significance.  We will note, however, when important variables are insignificant at
conventional levels.  In some of the regressions in Section 3.3.2, the unit of observation is the bank’s
portfolio in a particular year, rather than a particular loan.  In these regressions, with just over 6,500
observations, discussions of statistical significance at conventional levels are still meaningful.
3.3.1 Estimation results
Our results are consistent with the hypotheses that banks insulate firms against the costs of adverse
shocks to their creditworthiness and that access to core deposits increases banks’ ability to offer such
insurance.  Tables 3 and 4 present results using the three-year average core deposit ratio and other control
variables and one-year lagged core deposit ratio and other control variables, respectively.  (Columns (1) to (4)
correspond to our four measures of exogenous credit risk: the quality spread, !1×GDP growth,
!1×employment growth, and the state unemployment rate.)  First, note that each of our measures of credit
risk is significantly positively related to the loan markup.  Second, note that the coefficient on the cross-term
between our measures of core deposits and credit risk has the predicted negative sign in every case.  Thus,
banks with greater access to core deposits provide smoother rates in response to credit shocks.
Further, the magnitudes of the credit-risk insurance are economically meaningful: Using our
regressions, we compared the change in the loan markup implied by a one-standard-deviation increase in
credit risk at banks with low and high core deposit ratios.  For example, in the three-year average
specification, a one-standard-deviation change in quality spread (0.45 percentage points) would raise the
markup 48 basis points more for the bank with the minimum core deposit ratio in our sample than for the19
In our sample, the minimum and maximum three-year average core deposit ratios are 0.075 and
25
0.97, respectively, and the minimum and maximum one-year lagged core deposit ratios are 0. 082 and 0.99,
respectively.
Over our sample period, a one-standard-deviation change in the state unemployment rate is 2.3
26
percentage points; in the quality spread, 0.45 percentage points; in employment growth, 2.4 percentage
points; and in GDP growth, 3.8 percentage points.
Consider a similar thought experiment.  The three-year average and one-year lagged core deposit
27
ratios of Citibank, Continental Illinois, Morgan Guaranty, Chase Manhattan, Bankers Trust, Chemical Bank,
Bank of America, and Manufacturers Hanover averaged 0.25 and 0.26, respectively.  Both of these ratios
averaged 0.87 for the quarter of the sample with the highest ratios.  The difference in the change in markup
implied by a one-standard-deviation increase in our credit-risk measures between these two groups of banks
are as follows: for the three-year average specifications, the difference is 23 basis points when the state
unemployment rate is used to measure credit risk, 33 basis points when the quality spread is used, 35 basis
points when !1×employment growth is used, and 37 basis points when !1×GDP growth is used.  For the
one-year lagged specifications, these differences are 8 basis points when the state unemployment rate is used
to measure credit risk, 9 basis points when the quality spread is used, 24 basis points when !1×employment
growth is used, and 37 basis points when !1×GDP growth is used.
bank with the maximum core deposit ratio.   Similarly, for the three-year average specifications, the
25
difference in the change in markup between a bank with the minimum core deposit ratio and a bank with the
maximum core deposit ratio is 34 basis points when the state unemployment rate is used to measure credit
risk,  52 basis points when !1×employment growth is used, and 54 basis points when !1×GDP growth is
used.  For the one-year lagged specifications, these differences are 12 basis points when the state
unemployment rate is used to measure credit risk, 13 basis points when the quality spread is used, 36 basis
points when !1×employment growth is used, and 54 basis points when !1×GDP growth is used.   These
26
numbers are economically meaningful, and they are not unreasonable, since the mean markup charged on
above-prime loans in our sample is 413 basis points.
27
The signs on the coefficients of the contractual variables are consistent with prior findings in the
literature and economic sense.  They are also consistent with our view that the contractual terms are largely
exogenous proxies for borrower risk, rather than endogenously determined substitutes with the loan rate20
It might be argued that this alternative definition of core deposits is less contaminated by changes
28
in regulation that occurred in October 1982 (e.g., the introduction of MMDA accounts).
Since three of our four credit-risk variables vary by quarter but not by bank or loan, we could not
29
include dummy variables for each quarter.
markup.  For example, collateralized loans, spot loans, and smaller loans are all made at higher rates,
indicating that they are proxies for higher borrower risk.
3.3.2 Robustness tests
We have already mentioned some of our robustness tests.  (All of the results reported here are
available from the authors.)  Our results are robust to the use of alternative specifications to handle
endogeneity of some of the bank variables.  We reestimated the regressions using the contemporaneous
values of the core deposit ratio and other controls, although these measures suffer from potential endogeneity
problems; again, there was no qualitative change in results.  Likewise, when we use the average over the full
sample period of a bank’s core deposit ratio and controls, rather than three-year averages, we again get no
change in results.  Our results are also not qualitatively affected by dropping the contract-term variables, i.e.,
the loan’s size, the loan’s duration, whether the loan is collateralized, made under a prior commitment, or
made at a fixed rate. Thus, there is no evidence that the endogenous determination of non-price contract
variables and the markup is driving our empirical results.  Also, reestimating the equations with an alternative
measure of core deposits, namely, deposits less than $100,000 minus small time deposits as a fraction of
liabilities, again yielded similar results.
28
The results presented above include a simple time trend as a control for secular changes in financial
structure and conditions that is not picked up in our variables that vary over time.  We also reestimated our
regressions including dummy variables for each year, and again found little difference in results.   In
29
addition, because one of our credit-risk measures varies across banks and over time, namely, the state21
When the three-year average was used, the interaction term between core deposits and
30
unemployment was negative in 25 of the 44 regressions, and in 20 of these significantly so at the 10 percent
or better level.  In 14 of the remaining 19 regressions, the coefficient was significantly positive at the 10
percent or better level.  The specifications using the one-year lagged core deposit ratio and controls are
neutral, showing an even split of 22 negative and 22 positive cross-terms, with 17 significant negative and 16
significant positive coefficients.
This is similar to a standard random effects estimator, but it permits the data to be an unbalanced
31
panel, as ours are, since the number of loans varies across banks and over time.
unemployment rate, we reestimated its corresponding regressions for each of the 44 quarters from 1979Q1-
1989Q4 separately.  Our results are weaker, but still lend some support to those reported above, especially
when the three-year average core deposit ratio and controls are used.
30
To better account for possible correlation across the loans of any particular bank, we reestimated the
regressions allowing for a bank-specific component of the error term, as well as a component that varies over
time, bank, and loan.  (The bank-specific error term replaced bank-specific dummy variables in the quality
spread, !1×GDP growth, and !1×employment growth regressions.)   Again, there is no change in results.
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We investigated any potential bias in the results reported in Tables 3 and 4 that may have been
caused by selecting our sample of loans based on loan rate, i.e., whether the loan was priced above the prime
rate, while using markup as our dependent variable.  First, we reestimated the regressions for the full sample
of loans, including both above- and below-prime loans.  This yielded similar results to our above-prime
sample, which is not surprising, since there are many more above-prime loans than below-prime loans.  We
also estimated the regressions for loans priced two percentage points or more above the prime rate, with no
change in results.
Although we feel that the above- and below-prime breakdown best captures the theoretical
distinction between bank-dependent firms—to which our theory applies—and firms that routinely borrow in
public markets, the size of the borrowing firm is an alternative way of capturing the same idea.  We do not22
Although the results are not shown here, we also investigated whether banks more heavily financed
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with core deposits provide borrowers with better insurance against interest rate shocks, by estimating a
regression that included an interaction term between core deposits and the money market rate, in place of the
interaction term between core deposits and credit risk (we used the quality spread as our measure of credit
risk and we included bank-specific dummy variables).  In the three-year averages specification, the derivative
of the markup with respect to the money market rate is negative for all values of the core deposit ratio greater
than 20% and in the one-year lags specification it is always negative.  Since fewer than 5% of the
observations in the panel have core deposit ratios less than 20%, this suggests that nearly all banks are
smoothing interest rate shocks; moreover, the degree of smoothing is greater for banks with higher core
have information on borrower size, but we do know the size of the loans, and that smaller borrowers tend to
receive smaller loans.  Thus, if our theory holds, we expect to find credit-risk smoothing for the smaller loans. 
To test this, we reestimated our regressions for loans in the bottom third of the loan-size distribution (just
over 241,000 loans), and we found that banks with higher core deposits engage in more credit-risk
smoothing, i.e., the cross-term between credit risk and the core deposit ratio is negative, as it was for the
above-prime loan sample.  We also estimated the regressions for loans in the top third of the size distribution
and found that the signs of the cross-terms were much more mixed, with the cross-term being positive in the
one-year lag distributions, and significantly so except when !1×employment growth is used as the credit-risk
measure.  This is consistent with a portion of the larger loans being made to borrowers who have access to
national bank and nonbank credit markets, who are less in need of the credit-risk smoothing offered by banks.
A final test of robustness is to see whether our regressions support other results that have been fairly
well supported in the literature.  In particular, many studies have shown that loan rates are sticky in response
to shocks to money market rates, i.e., that banks seem to provide interest-rate smoothing to their borrowers
(see, e.g., Berger and Udell, 1992).  Our results are generally supportive of this finding.  As reported in
Tables 3 and 4, the coefficient on the money market rate is significantly negative except when !1×GDP




3.3.3 Other interpretations 
We have argued that our empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that banks with greater
access to core deposits can and do offer distinctive services compared to banks heavily dependent on
purchased funds.  In particular, core deposits have allowed banks to insulate bank-dependent borrowers from
credit shocks.
Alternative hypotheses are consistent with some of our results.  The first is the Petersen and Rajan
(1995) view that the smoothing of loan rates is the effect of monopoly power in loan markets rather than
deposit markets.  We believe that loan market power is unlikely to explain the relationships we find between
loan markups and banks’ core deposit ratios.  We include Petersen and Rajan’s indicator of loan market
power—the Herfindahl index for bank deposits—as a control variable in all of our regressions.  We also have
other controls for variations in the market power of the firm and the bank, specifically bank size and loan
size, and by considering only above-prime loans we severely restrict the sample variation in loan market
power.  After all of these controls, we retain economically and statistically significant effects for the bank’s
core deposits.  Finally, there is little reason to believe that our core deposit variable is acting as a proxy for
loan market power.  Without a direct measure of loan market power, this hypothesis is impossible to test
directly.  But using the bank’s deposit market Herfindahl as an imperfect proxy for loan market
concentration, we find a positive, but not particularly large, correlation coefficient of 0.44 between the core
deposit ratio and the Herfindahl index.
A second class of alternative explanations is that our results are being driven by a systematic
relationship between changes in the relative riskiness of banks’ portfolios and their core deposit ratios. There24
are two basic variants of this explanation, a demand-side and a supply-side version.
In the demand-side version, there is a relative decline in demand for loans from smaller or higher-risk
firms when aggregate risk increases.  Since smaller firms borrow disproportionately from smaller banks,
which also tend to have high core deposit ratios, the borrowing population might become disproportionately
safer at banks with high core deposit ratios.  But our regressions control for both bank size and loan size, so it
is highly unlikely that our empirical findings are being driven by this kind of change in demand.  Nonetheless,
these types of demand-side effects are addressed in tests reported below.  Note that we are not denying that
demand for loans falls disproportionately at small banks, only that our regressions have explicit controls for
this effect.
In the supply-side version, the negative correlation between core deposits and the sensitivity of loan
rate markups to exogenous changes in credit risk is the result of incomplete controls for the severity of bank
credit screens.  It should be noted that we have multiple controls for borrower risk in our regressions and that
the robustness of our results to dropping contract terms supports our interpretation of these terms as
exogenous indices of borrower risk.  Further, the highly significant coefficients on subsequent chargeoffs
provide strong evidence that our proxy for the severity of the bank’s credit screen does capture the intended
effect.  Also, the bank-specific dummy variables act as controls for bank-level differences in credit screening
policies.  Finally, our restriction to above-prime loans restricts the importance of “flight to quality” effects in
our results by limiting any potential change in the share of bank loans made to firms with access to public
markets.
Of course, our controls are not perfect.  If banks with high core deposit ratios systematically respond
to an increase in aggregate credit risk by tightening their credit standards more than banks with lower core
deposit ratios, the markups they charge to borrowers would be expected to increase less than the markupsPORTFOLIO RISKbt ’ a0 % a1CORE DEPOSIT RATIObt % a2CREDIT RISKbt
% a3CREDIT RISKbt × CORE DEPOSIT RATIObt % a4CONTROL VARIABLESbt .
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Although this interpretation is consistent with Kashyap and Stein’s model, their own work is
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concerned with the effects of monetary tightening rather than the effects of changes in aggregate credit risk.
charged by banks with lower core deposit ratios.  Thus, one would expect to see a negative correlation on the
cross-product between credit risk and core deposits, as we found, but it need not be related to banks providing
insurance against credit risk.
This scenario is consistent with two views in the literature.  Kashyap and Stein (1995) argue that
banks that are more heavily funded by deposits, especially small banks, face more daunting external finance
constraints.  If so, such banks might respond to external shocks to credit risk by increasing the severity of
their credit screens as part of a restriction in the supply of credit.   Keeley (1990) argues that banks with
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higher charter values are deterred from taking on risk.  Since high core deposit ratios are an indicator of
banks’ monopoly power in deposit markets, they also indicate higher charter value.  This again implies that
banks with higher core deposit ratios might react to an increase in credit risk by tightening their credit screens
more than banks with lower core deposit ratios.  It is important to note that to make an alternative supply-side
interpretation of our results, it does not suffice to make the plausible claim that credit screens are more
stringent for banks with higher core deposit ratios.  One must make the stronger (and less immediately
plausible) claim that such banks increase the severity of their credit screens disproportionately compared
with lower core deposit banks when aggregate credit risk increases.  Further, one must claim that the core
deposit ratio proxies for banks’ risk preferences in ways not already taken into account by our existing
controls.
To test whether any of these alternative stories explain our results, we ran the following regressions
for our panel of 126 banks:
(13)26
We obtained similar results when using the fraction of collateralized above-prime loans.
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Using the bank-specific dummy variables with state unemployment raises the R-squared of the
35
regressions, but the correlation between the dummy variables and state unemployment is high, confounding
the interpretation of the cross-term of interest.  Note, however, that whether the bank-specific dummies are
included or not has no effect on the sign or significance of the cross-term.
We examined four PORTFOLIO RISK variables: the proportion of a bank’s loan volume or number of loans,
respectively, that are collateralized (fraction collateralized-$ and fraction collateralized-#), since
collateralized loans may indicate riskier loans (as shown by Berger and Udell, 1990),  and the ratio of
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chargeoffs in the second and third years, respectively, after loans were made to total loans (chargeoffs-2 and
chargeoffs-3), since future chargeoffs indicate riskier loans.  The CREDIT RISK variables included the
quality spread, !1×GDP growth, !1×employment growth, and the state unemployment rate, and the
CONTROL VARIABLES included the intercept, the time trend, the Herfindahl index, the equity-to-asset
ratio, ln(total assets), the one-year T-bill rate, and the loan-to-deposit ratio.  Again, we measured the core
deposit ratio, equity-to-asset ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, and ln(total assets) as either three-year moving
averages or one-year lags, and we included bank-specific dummy variables for all measures of credit risk
except the state unemployment.  
35
Note that unlike our earlier regressions, the dependent variables reflect features of the bank’s
portfolio of loans rather than the loans individually, so our sample size drops dramatically, and conventional
significance levels have meaning.
For brevity, in Table 5 we present the estimated coefficients only for the variable of interest, the
interaction term (credit risk × core deposit ratio).  A significantly negative coefficient would indicate that, as
credit risk increases, banks with higher core deposit ratios take on less risk.  This would cast some doubt on
our interpretation of our previous results.  However, as shown in the top panel of Table 5, this never occurred27
It may be worth mentioning that we do not view our results as evidence against either Kashyap and
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Stein’s view that smaller banks are more credit constrained than larger banks or Keeley’s view that bank risk
taking is inversely related to charter value.
We did omit some outliers and some observations with missing values, leaving a sample of 8,788
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banks.  We could estimate the equation using all these banks when we did not include bank-specific dummy
variables; unfortunately, computer constraints precluded us from estimating with the full set of banks when
we included bank-specific dummy variables, so in these cases we selected a random sample of 1,000 banks. 
Without year dummy variables we found no negative coefficients on the cross-terms.  With year dummies we
found only one significant negative coefficient for the three-year averages specification (in the chargeoffs-2
regression when !1×GDP growth is used) and only two significant negative coefficients for the one-year lags
specification (in the chargeoffs-2 regression when !1×GDP growth or !1×employment growth is used). 
Thus, results for the 1,000 bank subsample support our other results.
when the three-year average core deposit ratio and controls were used; instead the cross-terms involving
quality spread and state unemployment are significantly positive, indicating that banks with higher core
deposit ratios were taking on more risk, not less.  When one-year lags are used, there are only three cross-
terms that are significantly negative: in the chargeoff-2 regression when either !1×GDP growth or
!1×employment growth is used to measure credit risk, and in the chargeoff-3 regression when !1×GDP
growth measures credit risk.  Again, however, all the cross-terms involving quality spread and unemployment
are significantly positive.  Thus, these results are generally unsupportive of the alternative interpretation of
our previous results.  We also used an alternative specification, replacing the trend variable with year-specific
dummy variables yields and found similar results.
36
One might be concerned that the lack of significance in some of the cross-terms shown in Table 5 is
due to reduced degrees of freedom (compared with our loan-based regressions reported in Tables 3 and 4),
but this does not appear to be the case.  Since the fraction collateralized variables are the only ones used in
equation (13) that are derived from the STBL and all the others instead come from the Call Reports, we were
also able to estimate the charegoffs-2 and chargeoffs-3 regressions for the full set of all banks that existed
over our sample period 1977Q1-1989Q4, whether they were STBL reporters or not.   In these regressions,
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which used 8,788 banks, we again find no support that banks with higher core deposit ratios took on less
risk—few, if any, cross-terms show a significant negative sign and those involving quality spread and the
state unemployment rate continue to show significant positive signs.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated empirically a particular channel of bank “uniqueness” linking the
structure of bank liabilities to bank lending behavior.  To our knowledge this channel has not been explored
previously.  Specifically, we have examined the hypothesis that access to core deposits permits a bank to
make contractual agreements with borrowers that are infeasible if the bank must pay market rates for its
funds.  Access to core deposits insulates a bank’s cost of funds from exogenous shocks.  In turn, the bank can
insulate its borrowers against exogenous credit shocks as part of a multiperiod implicit relationship.
Using a large sample of loans from the Survey of Terms of Bank Lending to Business, we find
convincing evidence for our story.  Specifically, we find that banks more heavily funded with core deposits
provide borrowers with smoother loan rates in response to exogenous changes in aggregate credit risk.  Thus,
we provide support for a view that has become prevalent among banking scholars: that part of the distinctive
character of bank lending is that firms and banks form multiperiod lending relationships, in which loans need
not break even period by period.  A unique feature of our results is that they provide evidence that banks’
access to core deposits has been one of the foundations of relationship lending.
 Our findings may also provide a partial answer to a question that is one of the underlying
motivations for the current research: How can we explain the banking sector’s shrinking share of
intermediated funds (disintermediation) and the shift toward intermediaries that hold securities rather than29
 For empirical evidence on these trends see Boyd and Gertler (1994) and Houston and James
38
(1996).  Empirical work on the causes of disintermediation is sparse.  It includes Becketti and Morris (1992)
and Laderman (1993).
loans (securitization)?   Our answer is that declining demand for deposits has not only raised banks’ cost of
38
funds—which directly reduces the supply of bank loans—but it has also reduced the feasibility of relationship
lending by banks—reducing the firms’ demand for bank loans as they have become less distinctive.  Thus,
one reason the banking sector has been shrinking is that bank loans have become less special as banks have
lost access to core deposits.30
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Table 1. Variable Definitions
markup loan rate minus rate on a Treasury security with the same duration as that of the
loan, where duration is calculated as given below
core deposit ratio bank’s deposits with denominations less than $100,000 as a fraction of
total liabilities
Credit-Risk Variables:
quality spread yield on Baa-rated long-term bonds minus yield on Aaa-rated long-term
bonds (Moody’s ratings)
state unemployment unemployment rate in the state in which the bank is headquartered
GDP growth growth rate of real GDP (1982 dollars) in the quarter (saar)
employment growth growth rate of payroll employment in the quarter (saar) 
Credit Risk × Core Deposit Ratio:
core deposit ratio × quality spread
core deposit ratio × state unemployment
core deposit ratio × GDP growth
core deposit ratio × employment growth
Bank-Specific Control Variables
chargeoffs-2 bank’s net chargeoffs in the second year after loan is granted / total loans
chargeoffs-3 bank’s net chargeoffs in the third year after loan is granted / total loans
loans/deposits bank’s total loans / total deposits
equity/assets bank’s total equity capital / total assets
total assets bank’s total assets in millions of 1982 dollars
Herfindahl weighted-average of Herfindahl indexes in all deposit markets in which




face value face value of the loan in millions of 1982 dollars
duration duration of the loan in years.  Before 1982, the frequency of interest
compounding was not included in the STBL data set, so for these loans,
duration = maturity (if a maturity date was stated for the loan) and duration
= 1/365 (if no maturity date was stated for the loan).  (We also reran
regressions calculating duration assuming frequency of interest
compounding was monthly, using the maturity indicated if a maturity date
was stated for the loan or maturity = 1/12 if no maturity date was stated for
the loan.  This alternative yielded similar results.)
collateralized = 1 if the loan was collateralized and 0 otherwise
commitment = 1 if the loan was made under a preexisting commitment and 0 otherwise
fixed base rate = 1 if loan has a fixed base rate and 0 otherwise
Other Variables:
trend linear time trend
money market rate rate on a Treasury security with the same duration as that of the loan, where
duration is calculated as given above
above prime = 1 if loan rate is above or equal to the prime rate on the day loan was made
and 0 otherwise
fraction collateralized-$ percent of a bank’s loan volume in a quarter that is collateralized
fraction collateralized-# percent of a bank’s number of loans in a quarter that are collateralized
one-year-T-bill rate quarterly average rate on one-year Treasury bills36
Table 2. Difference in Means and Medians Tests between Above-Prime Loan and Below-Prime
Loan Sample
Above-Prime Loans Below-Prime Loans
# of loans 627,499 83,982
markup 4.13%* 1.58%* mean
median 3.88%* 1.75%*
standard deviation 1.87% 1.97%
duration 0.4133 yrs.* 0.3969 yrs.* mean
median 0.1945 yrs.* 0.0833 yrs.*
standard deviation 0.7332 yrs. 1.068 yrs.
collateralized 63.16%* 40.68%* mean
commitment 59.36%* 56.75%* mean
face value $259,800* $3.294 mill.*
1 mean
median $29,640* $149,300*
standard deviation $1.922 mill. $9.916 mill.
fixed base rate 27.99%* 69.27%* mean
total assets $22.74 bill.* $28.16 bill.*
1 mean
median $  6.35 bill.* $  5.30 bill*
standard deviation $40.48 bill. $41.62 bill.
equity/assets 5.671%* 5.586%* mean
median 5.618%* 5.453%*
standard deviation 1.372% 1.379%
loans/deposits 77.93%* 77.16%* mean
median 77.22%* 75.72%*
standard deviation 14.48% 14.80%
core deposit ratio 56.50%* 49.26%* mean
median 59.42%* 51.78%*
standard deviation 18.58% 20.90%




Table 3. Regression Results for Above-Prime Loan Sample: Three-year Averages of Core Deposit
Ratio and Controls†
 Dependent Variable: markup
(1) (2) (3) (4)
quality spread !1×GDP growth !1×employment growth state unemployment
No. of loans 627,499 627,499 627,499 531,536
Adjusted R











core deposit ratio 0.002857* !0.04502* !0.02888* 0.005633*
(5.395) (!100.8) (!66.26) (11.22)
Credit Risk × Core Deposit Ratio:
core deposit ratio ×
    quality spread
!1.186*
(!47.06)
core deposit ratio ×
   !1×GDP growth
!0.001575*
(!54.30)
core deposit ratio ×
    !1×employment growth
!0.002426*
(!53.93)
core deposit ratio ×




(1) (2) (3) (4)
quality spread !1×GDP growth !1×employment growth state unemployment
Contract Terms:
duration !0.006310* !0.006293* !0.005998* !0.006558*
(!228.3) (!223.6) (!225.9) (!198.6)
ln(face value) !0.001555* !0.001749* !0.001707* !0.001546*
(!120.9) (!133.6) (!138.4) (!102.8)
collateralized 0.001978* 0.001677* 0.001901* 0.001213*
(44.72) (37.27) (44.82) (23.10)
commitment !0.002711 * !0.003167* !0.003001* !0.001984*
(!55.66) (!63.89) (!64.22) (!36.12)
fixed base rate 0.002173* 0.001286* 0.001600* 0.001076*
(40.86) (23.78) (31.39) (17.30)
Bank-Specific Control Variables:
loans/deposits !0.02307*  !0.01756* !0.01384* !0.005970 *
(!72.06) (!54.02) (!45.11) (27.11)
equity/assets !0.003076 0.09884* 0.01720* !0.05521*
(23.98) (4.343) (!19.61) (!0.733)
chargeoffs-2 0.01231*  !0.04476* !0.01023* !0.01120*
(4.335) (!15.53) (!3.762) (!3.644)
chargeoffs-3 0.02725* 0.07183* 0.04669* 0.06342*
(11.29) (29.26) (20.17) (24.87)
ln(total assets) 0.002666* !0.006126* !0.002747* !0.001050*
(22.21) (!51.61) (!24.49) (!40.76)
Herfindahl 2.808×10  1.007×10 * 1.223×10 * 1.166×10 *
!6





trend 0.000149* 0.000203* 0.000061615* !0.000214*
(65.52) (88.62) (27.80) (!67.65)
money market rate !0.04272* 0.01623* !0.061198* !0.009273*
(!51.08) (20.23) (!76.53) (!8.537)
†Bank-specific dummy variables are included in the quality spread, !1×GDP growth, and !1×employment growth regressions; an
intercept is included in the state unemployment regression; these coefficients are not reported but are available from the authors. 
Regressions use the three-year averages of the core deposit ratio, ln(total assets), loans/deposits, and equity/assets.
*Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. t-statistics in parentheses.39
Table 4. Regression Results for Above-Prime Loan Sample: One-Year Lagged Values of Core Deposit Ratio
and Controls†
 Dependent Variable: markup
(1) (2) (3) (4)
quality spread !1×GDP growth !1×employment growth state unemployment
No. of loans 627,499 627,499 627,499 531,536
Adjusted R











core deposit ratio 0.02299*  !0.03175*  !0.009817* 0.004367*
(48.71) (!86.35) (!27.15) (8.927)
Credit Risk × Core Deposit Ratio:
core deposit ratio ×
     quality spread
!0.3292*
(!13.08)
core deposit ratio ×
    !1×GDP growth
!0.001543*
(!53.96)
core deposit ratio ×
    !1×employment growth
!0.001652*
(!36.86)
core deposit ratio ×




(1) (2) (3) (4)
quality spread !1×GDP growth !1×employment growth state unemployment
Contract Terms:
duration !0.006378* !0.006413* !0.006060* !0.006513*
(!230.6) (!227.2) (!227.9) (!196.7)
ln(face value) !0.001542* !0.001735* !0.001701* !0.001527*
(!119.7) (!132.0) (!137.6) (!101.5)
collateralized 0.001835* 0.001660* 0.001860* 0.001234*
(41.44) (36.73) (43.75) (23.46)
commitment !0.002726* !0.003054* !0.002895* !0.001938*
(!55.85) (!61.34) (!61.80) (!35.26)
fixed base rate 0.002068* 0.001207* 0.001595* 0.001046*
(38.82) (22.23) (31.20) (16.82)
Bank-Specific Control Variables:
loans/deposits !0.002532* !0.008200* !0.01169* 0.000465**
(!9.727) (!30.84) (!46.68) (2.231)
equity/assets  0.03435* 0.008579** !0.02227* !0.056442*
(10.38) (2.544) (!7.007) (!21.95)
chargeoffs-2 !0.005245 !0.002709 0.01653* !0.050028*
(5.798) (!17.26) (!1.921) (!0.880)
chargeoffs-3 0.01280* 0.07421* 0.05237* 0.06043*
(5.327) (30.33) (22.74) (23.77)
ln(total assets) 0.006999* !0.002807* 0.001007* !0.000712*
(63.23) (!25.67) (9.766) (!28.85)
Herfindahl 1.257×10 * 9.789×10 * !2.02×10 ** 7.93×10 *
!6
(12.25) (9.333) (!2.050) (23.00)
!7 !7 !7
Other Control Variables:
trend 0.000036733* 0.000119* 0.000009119* !0.000259*
(17.20) (55.37) (4.438) (!84.09)
money market rate !0.02671* 0.027571* !0.053300* !0.003319*
(!32.65) (34.89) (!67.29) (!3.049)
†Bank-specific dummy variables are included in the quality spread, !1×GDP growth, and !1×employment growth regressions; an
intercept is included in the state unemployment regression; these coefficients are not reported but are available from the authors. 
Regressions use the one-year lagged values of the core deposit ratio, ln(total assets), loans/deposits, and equity/assets.
*Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. t-statistics in parentheses.41
Table 5. Portfolio-Risk Regression Results for the Panel†
(1) (2) (3) (4)
fraction fraction collateralized- chargeoffs-2 chargeoffs-3
collateralized-# $
3-year moving averages††
core deposit ratio ×
    quality spread
823.7* 592.9* 0.4464* 0.9874*
(2.718) (2.824) (3.949) (7.517)
            Adjusted R 0.4815 0.5358 0.3029 0.3141
2
core deposit ratio × !0.3334 !0.262703 !0.00008772 !0.000227
   !1×GDP growth (!0.950) (!1.079) (!0.671) (!1.489)
            Adjusted R 0.4798 0.5810 0.3018 0.3055
2
core deposit ratio × 0.5069 0.318305 !0.000234 0.000244
    !1×employment growth (0.5699) (0.805) (!1.100) (0.981)
            Adjusted R 0.4803 0.5821 0.3027 0.3051
2
core deposit ratio ×
    state unemployment
3.932* 2.259* 0.001239* 0.002552*
(4.713) (3.331) (3.989) (6.962)
            Adjusted R 0.2706 0.1638 0.1168 0.1045
2
1-year lagged values†††
core deposit ratio ×
    quality spread
996.7* 524.5** 0.2257** 0.6344*
(3.23) (2.455) (2.006) (4.719)
            Adjusted R 0.4810 0.5837 0.3324 0.3062
2
core deposit ratio × !0.1739 !0.2048
   !1×GDP growth (!0.490) (!0.834)
!0.000363* !0.000434*
(!2.808) (!2.806)
            Adjusted R 0.4789 0.5823 0.3327 0.3029
2
core deposit ratio × 0.8220 0.4301 !0.000386
    !1×employment growth (1.415) (1.070) (!1.522)
!0.000871*
(!4.130)
            Adjusted R 0.4794 0.5831 0.3363 0.3018
2
core deposit ratio ×
    state unemployment
4.005* 1.639* 0.001711* 0.002592*
(4.953) (2.489) (5.723)      (7.273)
            Adjusted R 0.2658 0.1596 0.1278 0.0978
2
† Regressions also include trend, loans/deposits, equity/assets, ln(total assets), Herfindahl index, one-year Treasury bill rate, core deposit
ratio; the quality spread, !1×GDP growth, and !1×employment growth regressions also include bank-specific dummy variables; the state
unemployment regressions include an intercept; these coefficients are not reported but are available from the authors.  Regressions
involving quality spread, !1×GDP growth, and !1×employment growth are estimated using 6,414 observations; those involving state
unemployment rate use 5,358 observations.
†† Regressions use the three-year moving averages of the core deposit ratio, ln(total assets), loans/deposits, and equity/assets.
††† Regressions use the one-year lagged values of the core deposit ratio, ln(total assets), loans/deposits, and equity/assets.
*Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 10% level. t-statistics in parentheses.